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1. Introduction 
When seen through the trade policy lens, an otherwise unremarkable 2013 may well be remembered 
for entrenching a new chapter in the nature of multilateral trade negotiations.  After a long period of  
post-NAFTA  (North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement)  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)-centric  trade  
liberalisation, there is now a new zeal for negotiating multi-nation regional initiatives (mega-regionals)  
or super-regional trade agreements (henceforth super-RTAs)1. Given their design and structuring, these 
negotiations are not held on a global multilateral basis, although they are being negotiated between  
rather large and diverse groups of economic entities that together account for over 60 percent of global  
trade.  This  latter  feature  makes  them  somewhat  multilateral  and  “brings  to  mind  the  early  GATT  
Rounds” (Dadush, 2013). In the making there are two super-RTAs in the Asia-Pacific region, namely the  
negotiations on Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement (RCEP or the ASEAN+6) and 
the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and one transatlantic super-RTA: the Transatlantic Trade and  
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the 28-member European Union. These talks are 
intended to achieve 'gold standard' deep and comprehensive trade agreements, setting new rules and 
regulatory standards that are expected to put pressure on the large emerging economies left outside  
the deals to adapt or suffer the consequences2. 
1 In the earlier phase, EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, APEC and Mercosur were all part of a larger politico-strategic commitment to 
regionalism that used trade policy to ensure that the overall competitive strengths of the target regions were maximised. 
2 Bergsten (1996) showed that fear of being crowded out of export markets as a result of trade agreements between 
partners – ie trade diversion effects – was a powerful motivation to engage in new multilateral negotiations. In the early 
1990s in particular, NAFTA helped to bring closure to the WTO’s Uruguay Round negotiations.
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Figure 1: Trade within the super-RTA groups relative to extra-EU global trade 
Source: Bruegel based on UNCTAD data.
The popular explanation for this renewed interest in regionalism lies in the moribund nature of the Doha  
Round of multilateral  free-trade talks and the fear of outright exclusion or reduced influence of the  
industrialised countries in a new world in which emerging economies have an increasingly stronger 
voice  in  global  rule/policy  making.  The  new  super-RTAs  have  therefore  de  facto taken  over  the 
responsibility for establishing global trade rules that address current and prospective trade concerns,  
which the 12 year-old somnambulant Doha Round is deemed unable to address. The super-RTAs are  
also designed to counteract the increasing loss of influence of industrialised countries in world trade  
matters (Figure 1 shows a dramatic fall in the TPP and TTIP groups' share of extra-EU world trade since  
2000).  In  this  respect,  the  situation  is  starkly  different  from  the  early  years  of  GATT,  when  the  
industrialised countries were able to influence the structuring of global trade rules in their favour, which  
still continues through historic legacy. This is also implicit in the demand of the key emerging economy 
WTO members at the Doha Round negotiations to level the existing uneven playing field, a move that  
can potentially be subverted by the creation of new multilateral trading forums such as the TPP and the  
TTIP. Interestingly,  “(o)f the 26 Geneva Round participants… twelve are participating in the TTIP, three  
are participating in the TPP, and one—the United States, positioned once again at the center of the  
system—is participating in both” (Dadush, 2013).
But what does this development mean for the large Asian emerging economies such as China and 
India, which are on the fringes of these super-RTA negotiations? Will the regionals be alternate ways to  
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pressure the large emerging economies to follow new trade rules and tougher regulations set by the  
industrialised countries, especially given the strong (dissenting) voice of economies such as China  
and  India  in  the ongoing WTO  negotiations on many  of  the  proposals  from  western countries?  An  
important case in point is the proposal for ever-stronger intellectual property protection in the US-led  
trade agreements. This can  de facto undermine some of the safeguards (albeit rarely used) that the 
TRIPS agreement provides to developing countries by allowing a certain degree of flexibility to limit  
patent protection in the interest of the health concerns of their citizens. The TPP in particular is deemed  
retrogressive in several of its elements, given its US-corporate-sector-led agenda, and it might in these  
respects even work against WTO principles3. 
It should be remembered that navigating such large regional agreements is not a new experience, and  
developing countries live with the asymmetries enshrined in NAFTA and APEC in the last century. That  
said, the twenty-first century is a whole new world, and this paper will assess how super-RTAs might 
emerge as game changers in the multilateral trade rules promulgated by the WTO.
To do this,  we briefly outline the scope and ambition level of the super-RTA negotiations,  and then  
examine  how  their  new  asymmetric  provisions  might  impact  China  and  India.  We  discuss  the 
possibility of the dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) designed in these agreements becoming 
multilateralised and posing serious challenges to the WTO’s role as global rule-maker and arbiter. Prima  
facie, the new super-RTAs run the risk of exacerbating the divergence between regional and WTO trade 
rules by continuing to erode the WTO's central position in multilateral trade dispute settlement, and 
might  emerge  as  game  changers  in  the  global  trade  governance.  We  will  address  this  through  an 
analysis of the feasibility of regulatory cohesion under the super-RTAs given the existing institutional  
mechanisms, trade policy and regulatory philosophy (and practice) in selected stakeholder countries,  
as a reality check on the proposed subversion of the global trade governance regime.
The paper is  structured as follows.  Section 2 discusses in  brief  the scope and state of play in the  
different  super-RTAs.  Section  3  examines  the  possible  impact  of  super-RTAs  on  China  and  India,  
addressing  the  problem  from  the  perspective  of  political-economy  effects  of  regulatory  (regime) 
change.  Section 4 concludes with some policy and strategy  options for  these two emerging Asian  
countries, taking into account the recent dynamic developments in their economic and trade policy  
strategies.
3 For example, in the case of its treatment of the sensitive issue of data exclusivity and ever-greening of drug patents. 
Prompted by the domestic pharmaceutical lobby, in the TPP, the USTR’s office is reportedly backtracking on WTO principles – 
for example, access to generic medicines – that Congress had inserted into its earlier trade agreements, like that with Peru. 
This over-riding of WTO principles may have particularly serious implications for emerging Asian countries with multiple 
public policy objectives. Panagariya (2014) offers an analysis of the ongoing US-India discontent on the latter’s TRIPS 
obligations.
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2. Scope and ambition in super-RTA negotiations
All three of the super-RTAs are being negotiated in the single undertaking mode under which nothing is 
agreed to until everything is agreed.
RCEP, driven by ASEAN, is a free-trade agreement between ASEAN and it’s regional partners – Australia,  
New Zealand, China, South Korea, Japan and India. It is envisaged as a mutually beneficial economic  
partnership agreement that will  broaden and deepen current free-trade engagements in the region. 
RCEP is designed to be WTO-compliant and is based on an open accession clause, ie welcoming the  
participation of any ASEAN partner that chooses to participate later (dubbed 'open-regionalism'). It is  
also the only super-RTA that involves the two emerging Asian giants, namely China and India. According 
to a recent study by Petri,  Plummer and Zhai (2012) 4, the deal will  provide income gains of around 
US$644 billion in 2025, representing 0.6 percent of the world’s GDP, through the freer flow of goods,  
services, investments and labour between the participating economies5. However, concluding a high-
level deep agreement is not going to be an easy task, especially as the RCEP’s guiding principles are to  
recognise  “the individual and diverse circumstances”, take into consideration  “the different levels of  
development of the participating countries” and allow for  “appropriate forms of flexibility  including  
provision for special and differential treatment, plus additional flexibility to the least-developed ASEAN  
Member States” (ASEAN, 2012).
The TPP, now with 12 participating countries led by the US6 (Australia,  Brunei Darussalam, Canada, 
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US and Vietnam), is meanwhile being  
pushed as a 'living agreement' with a 'WTO-plus' approach7.  The countries involved accelerated their 
work to meet the target of concluding a deal by the end of 2013,  but breakthroughs are yet to be 
reached in the discussions and officials (and industry experts) agree that landing zones are not in 
sight in many of the contentious issues, viz. intellectual property, state-owned enterprises, financial  
regulation. Petri, Plummer and Zhai (2012) estimate that an ambitious TPP could yield annual global 
income gains of US$295 billion in 2025, with more benefits accruing to the countries that joined later,  
4 For summaries on net global and country-specific gains see, Note on Alternative Asian Track Scenarios at 
http://asiapacifictrade.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Asian-track-alternatives.pdf  . 
5 Fukunaga and Isono (2013) argue that realising the RCEP potential will call for a comprehensive and high-level agreement 
by 2015, that (1) sets the target of 95 percent tariff elimination with a “common concession” approach, (2) introduces the 
“core non-tariff measures (NTMs)” concept and removes them, allows co-equal rules in the rules of origin (ROOs), setting a 
general rule of “RVC(40) or CTH” (i.e. “40 percent regional value added or change in tariff heading at 4-digit levels”) and 
developing consolidated operational certification procedures; (3) introduces concrete and tangible trade facilitation 
programmes and addressing FTA utilisation issues; and (4) liberalises trade in services at a high level. 
6 The 4-member Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPSEP or P4) of 2005, a free trade agreement 
between Brunei, Chile, Singapore, and New Zealand, was expanded in March 2010 to include other interested parties from 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), most importantly the US.
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suggesting that enlargement of the agreement is “incentive consistent”8. The trade liberalisation rate, a 
key indicator of a nation’s willingness to open up its markets, differs from one trade partner to another,  
but the standard rate among TPP members is more than 90 percent. However, the TPP rules call for the  
negotiating  process  to  be  managed  by a  small  group  of  people,  and  for  circulation  of  information 
beyond this group to be limited, and this lack of transparency is a major source of concern 9 for all non-
member countries, and even for key stakeholders in the TPP member countries including in the US,  
especially those that fear potential losses because of the agreement. Bridging the differences between  
the  members  at  various  stages  of  economic  development  to  arrive  at  a  high-level  agreement  is  
expected to be another difficult task, especially when it comes to sensitive sectors 10. Finally, the lack of 
a 'fast-track' process for congressional approval in the US is now acknowledged to be a deterrent for the 
conclusion of the TPP; without the Presidential fast-track authority (widely not expected to be granted  
until after the US mid-term elections in November), TPP partners are unlikely to make their final offers  
for fear of the deal being unravelled by the US Congress. 
The RCEP builds on ASEAN’s experience and is expected to bring together all the five ASEAN+1 free-
trade agreements (FTAs) into an integrated regional economic framework. The RCEP's ASEAN-centricity 
implies that it will be guided by the 'ASEAN way,' under which objectives and commitments are driven  
by  a  consensus  decision-making  process  and  are  voluntary  and  non-binding.  By  comparison,  in 
addition to the trade component in goods, services and investment, the TPP is expected to have a more 
demanding set of market access commitments in 'WTO-plus'  issues and in the 'WTO-extra'  subjects 
(categorisation by Horn et al, 2009) that are beyond the WTO’s current mandate: intellectual property 
(IP) rights,  labour standards,  competition policy,  investment rules,  customs laws,  e-commerce, the  
environment, government procurement and the role of state-owned enterprises. Most of these issues  
might  not  have  immediate  direct  trade-related  aspects  but  are  deemed  to  be  twenty-first  century 
challenges (Basu Das, 2013). The TPP is being promoted as a 'gold-standard' free-trade agreement and 
is  expected  to  harmonise  conditions  for  businesses  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region  through  regulatory 
convergence among members, going beyond the recent trade facilitation agreement negotiated at the  
WTO’s Bali ministerial conference (Karmakar, 2013a, evaluates the net gains from the WTO Bali deal).  
7 The term ‘WTO-plus’ is applied in various contexts. It basically reflects the commitments made or obligations assumed that 
are more stringent than what is currently imposed or required under the WTO agreements. 
8 For summaries on net global and country-specific gains see, Note on Alternative TPP-Track Scenarios at 
http://asiapacifictrade.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/TPP-track-alternatives.pdf 
9 TPP is also criticised for its retrogressive elements like non-transparent negotiations and a divisive approach to integration.
10 The TPP has stirred protests in various countries amid fears it could leave domestic markets exposed to foreign 
competition. Powerful agriculture lobbies in Japan are resisting the TPP and concerns have been raised that Japanese 
demands for exceptions in its five sensitive farm products may present a sticking point. Several countries have also 
indicated “serious difficulties” with the agreement’s potential impact on state-owned firms.
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However,  TPP  members  are  at  different  levels  of  economic  development  and  the  WTO-plus  issues 
covered under the TPP will require significant reform to the domestic industrial and economic policies  
of most members, and might raise challenges for the countries/sectors that need economic reform and  
for economies that have state-owned enterprises.
Box 1: State of play in the three super-RTA negotiations
RCEP is a 16-member group driven by ASEAN which launched negotiations in November 2012. The 
third round of negotiations was held 20-24 January 2014. Negotiations are expected to be concluded  
by  end-2015.  It  proposes  to  create  a  16-country  integrated  market  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region  of 
around 3.35 billion people with a combined GDP of US$21.4 trillion or 27 percent of global GDP.
TPP is a US-led initiative now with 12 participating countries; the group held its twenty-first meeting in 
Singapore 7-10 December 2013. The agreement was originally proposed to be concluded by the end  
of 2013, but unforeseen delays have led negotiators to push the target completion date to mid-2014.  
TPP-12 countries, representing more than 800 million people, account for nearly 40 percent of global  
GDP and about one-third of world trade.
TTIP is the newest super-RTA, with negotiations launched in March 2013 and talks still at a very early  
stage. Originally proposed for an end-2014 conclusion, slippage is already apparent; officials caution  
that the informal mid-2014 deadline to conclude TTIP negotiations is now likely to be pushed back to  
2015. The range and complexity of the potential regulatory issues are also so vast that EU officials 
admit they would be unlikely to be finalised in a single deal. Instead, TTIP would function more as a  
'living agreement', which would establish a framework for regulators. 
The  transatlantic  TTIP  is  an  ambitious,  comprehensive,  and  high-standard  trade  and  investment 
agreement that  will  offer  significant  benefits  by promoting international  competitiveness,  jobs and  
growth in the partner countries. Together, the US and the EU account for almost half of global output and 
a third of world trade11; the stock of shared direct investment adds up to more than US$3.6 trillion. The 
aim of TTIP is “to liberalise, as much as possible, trade and investment between the two blocs” in the 20  
areas12 that  the  agreement  is  expected  to  cover.  An  independent  study  by  Francois  et  al  (2013) 
11 Bilateral trade as a share of global trade (excluding intra-EU trade) however has declined sharply by nearly half since 
2001, and according to the latest UNCTAD data was at 4.39 percent in 2012.
12 These include: market access for agricultural and industrial goods, government procurement, investment, energy and raw 
materials, regulatory issues, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, services, intellectual property rights, sustainable 
development, small- and medium-sized enterprises, dispute settlement, competition, customs/trade facilitation, and state-
owned enterprises. The comprehensive trade and investment agreement aims to achieve ambitious outcomes in three 
broad areas: a) market access; b) regulatory issues and non-tariff barriers; and c) rules, principles, and new modes of 
cooperation to address shared global trade challenges and opportunities.
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estimated that an ambitious and comprehensive13 agreement could bring significant economic gains 
for the EU as a whole (approximately US$88.7 to US$155.1 billion a year until 2027, depending on the 
content  of  the  negotiated  agreement)  and  for  the  US  (US$64.4  to  US$123.5  billion  a  year),  while  
increasing global income by almost US$130 billion annually as a result of increased bilateral trade. 
However, as much as 80 percent of the total potential gains from the TTIP are to come from cutting  
costs  imposed  by  bureaucracy  and  regulations (so-called  non-tariff  barriers  or  NTBs),  and  from 
liberalising trade in services and public procurement. Although tariffs between the US and the EU are  
already low (on average 4 percent),  the cost of dealing with unnecessary bureaucracy can add an 
equivalent to tariffs of 10-20 percent to the price of goods, which is usually borne by consumers.  But 
tackling these kinds of non-tariff barriers is easier said than done, and the two trade partners have been 
discussing regulatory harmonisation in key traded products/sectors for nearly two decades now. Also,  
the remaining tariffs will be harder to reduce than imagined. High tariffs in sugar, textiles and garments,  
steel and trucks have existed for so long because there are powerful vested interests that are loath to  
forgo their  advantages.  Finally,  the TTIP  negotiations are  not  all  encompassing;  they will  not  cover 
agricultural subsidies, subsidies to aircraft manufacturers or movement of temporary workers, nor are  
likely to comprehensively cover IP rules and financial sector regulation. Therefore, and despite different 
studies having already outlined the economic and strategic benefits of TTIP, the debate is still open on 
the feasibility of a deep trade agreement, and even its desirability.
It  is  envisaged that  the super-RTAs will  generate new momentum for multilateral  liberalisation  and  
provide a boost to trade and economic growth in the participating industrialised member countries. The  
agreements will also reinforce the global influence of participants as international standard- and rule-
setters. This directly reflects the unease in the industrialised world about the turbo-charged rise of the  
emerging economies over the earlier decade, and the fear that the global order is no longer dictated by  
the West, which, in particular, is less able to stand up to an increasingly economically powerful China 
(and  possibly  also  India  in  the  near  future).  To  Stiglitz  (2013)  these  negotiations  are  “not  about  
establishing a true free-trade system. Instead, the goal is a managed trade regime – managed, that is,  
to serve the special interests that have long dominated trade policy in the West,”  while to Messerlin 
(2012),  they are a strategy to  “bypass the WTO’s consensus structure and write the rules of ‘WTO  
version  2.0’.”.  However,  given  that  most  of  the  gains  are  expected  to  emerge  from  eliminating  
regulatory and beyond-the-border barriers (merchandise trade is largely free already), the impact of  
13 The comprehensive option includes two scenarios: a less ambitious agreement that includes a 10 percent reduction in 
trade costs from NTBs and nearly full tariff removal (98 percent of tariffs) and an ambitious scenario that includes the 
elimination of 25 percent of NTB related costs and 100 percent of tariffs. In both scenarios more ambition is imposed on the 
lowering of procurement-related NTBs than for other NTBs affecting goods and services. It is assumed that NTBs linked to 
procurement are reduced by 25 percent or 50 percent, in the “less ambitious” and in the “ambitious” scenarios respectively.
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which is as difficult to measure and attribute to increased trade flows as it is to eliminate the barriers in  
the first place, a large part of the projected gains might remain unrealised.
3. The impact of super-RTAs on China and India 
We now examine the potential impact of the super-RTA’s on two non-member large emerging markets,  
China and India.  The impact  can be felt  in  two ways:  (1)  indirectly by undermining the WTO’s pre-
eminence as a multilateral rule-setter and arbiter, and (2) directly because of the 'rearranging of the  
deck' which these super-RTAs aim to achieve. 
In the first indirect case, clearly, the overriding concern from the WTO’s perspective is the prospect that 
it will increasingly become irrelevant as a trade liberalisation platform, should the super-RTAs manage  
to achieve their ambitious liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation targets before the Doha Round is 
formally concluded, though this remains doubtful because meeting the highly ambitious timelines are 
already proving to be impossible unless the scope of the agreements is considerably diluted 14.  The 
conclusion of these deep RTAs will however be disadvantageous to the emerging economies not only  
because  of  their  exclusion  during  the  treaties’  formation  phase,  but  more  because  the  WTO-led  
multilateral decision-making and adjudication processes give these countries equal voice15 and ability 
to address domestic growth concerns and sensitivities. Regionalism as envisaged in the super-RTAs is 
thus a sub-optimal strategy for China and India, especially at their present stage of development. 
Two direct consequences of rapid growth in large developing countries has been that (i) the old Quad  
(the  EU,  the  US,  Japan  and  Canada)  that  could  once  hammer  out  multilateral  trade  deals  at  the 
GATT/WTO has less relevance today, and (ii) there is a greatly muted reaction from the large developing 
countries (bordering on ennui)  to  any regional  trade agreement negotiated by the Quad members.  
Sustained growth in large emerging economies has also eroded the ability of the old Quad to negotiate 
global trade deals that meet the expectations and interests of their domestic industry stakeholders.  
Hence the understandable disconnection of industrialised country business lobbyists from the Doha  
Round16,  in  stark  contrast  to  their  very  active  engagement  and  the  political  pressure  that  they  
exercised  during  the  Uruguay  Round.  Also,  NAFTA  exerted  a  perceptible  domino  effect  during  the  
14 However, following the missed 2013 goalpost of TPP, negotiators expressed their will to continue intensive work with 
flexibility to finalise the text issues as well as market access issues towards an ambitious agreement.
15 Arising from the WTO’s egalitarian one-country-one-vote principle and equal veto powers for all members.
16 One of the big problems of the Doha talks is that they have attracted very little interest from the US business community 
whose support is absolutely necessary to get US Congressional approval, especially in view of the absence of a Presidential 
“fast track” authorisation for negotiating trade agreements.
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closing days of the Uruguay Round, leading to the capitulation of many a nay-sayer. But, as succinctly  
put by a leading trade analyst at a recent meeting, the “days of neo-classical ‘build it and they’ll beg to  
join’ treaty constructs are long over”17. Hence, both industrialised and developing countries are focused 
on negotiating regional and bilateral agreements that suit domestic interests. Nevertheless, the current  
WTO rules served well during the recent economic and financial crisis, with relatively little increase in  
protectionism, notwithstanding the massive structural changes (compounded by the crisis) associated 
with the unprecedented rise of emerging markets, in particular China. This experience has underlined 
that,  despite  its  supposed  inability  to  seal  the  market  access  negotiations,  the  WTO’s  dispute-
settlement abilities and role as a global  arbitrator/rules enforcer remains undiminished and as yet  
unchallenged. 
However,  with  the  so-called  'proliferation'  of  more  solid  and  far-reaching  dispute  settlement  
mechanisms in  the RTAs,  there is  a  fear  of  overlap and conflicts  with the WTO Dispute Settlement  
Mechanism. This has the potential to become a major factor in the governance of global trade. Studies 
of the RTA dispute settlement mechanisms usually highlight that the increased density, volume and 
complexity of international norms requiring correspondingly sophisticated mechanisms to guarantee 
their  smooth operation and accurate interpretation are the key reason why RTA dispute settlement 
mechanisms are needed. Such dispute settlement mechanisms have also started to challenge the 
coherence  of  international  jurisprudence.  As  the  jurisdiction  of  WTO  bodies  broadens,  along  with  
regional courts and tribunals, the possibility of overlap seems to increase (Biukovic, 2008). So far the 
RTAs have created intergovernmental structures with relatively weak enforcement mechanisms, but  
this  is  expected  to  change  with  the  super-RTAs.  The  super-RTAs  are  led  by  strong  rule-oriented 
economies such as  the US and the EU,  which  have the necessary  will  and capability  to  establish  
stronger institutions and to implement monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, as has been done 
during European integration and to a lesser extent in NAFTA. 
Moreover,  the  potential  for  jurisdictional  overlap  between  the  WTO  and  RTA  dispute  settlement 
mechanisms stem not only from jurisdictional  overlaps leading to a 'double breach' of both an RTA  
obligation and a WTO obligation,  but also from the deliberate creation of RTA countermeasures that  
violate  WTO  rules18.  While  they  retain  the  'regional'  moniker,  the  fact  that  super-RTAs  now  involve 
17 Pierre Sauve, at the IMD organised meeting entitled “WTO Blueskying: Ideas for the new DG”, 28 June, 2013.
18 Given that many countermeasures capable of being taken under an RTA will involve a breach of WTO obligations, it 
becomes necessary to reflect further on the nature of the permission the WTO gives its members to conclude RTAs and 
whether this permission entails that RTAs parties may use trade countermeasures in their RTA relations. There is no clear 
provision in the WTO stating whether RTAs parties can take a trade-countermeasure that would be inconsistent with WTO 
obligations. Ultimately, the answer to this question depends on whether GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V provide an 
exception for all measures taken in conformity with a WTO compliant RTA, or instead require some sort of ‘connection’ 
between the measure claimed to be taken in conformity with the RTA and the WTO. In sum the legal consequences of the 
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countries spanning the globe makes them multilateral to some degree, and proportionately increases  
the likelihood that super-RTA dispute settlement mechanisms will  exacerbate divergences between 
regional and WTO trade rules by continuing to erode the central role of the WTO in multilateral trade 
jurisprudence. A related concern is the potential threat of forum shopping by industrial country multi-
national corporations in favour of the RTA dispute settlement mechanisms, which will most likely allow 
for investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms as opposed to the state-state dispute mechanism 
under  the  WTO19.  As  more  and  more  economies  plug  into  global  value-chain  production  systems,  
sovereign governments will  have less control  over the likely preference of multinationals to opt for  
investor-state  dispute  settlement  mechanisms.  The  consequent  rise  in  RTA  dispute  settlement 
mechanism jurisprudence will further accelerate the erosion of the WTO's centrality in multilateral trade 
dispute resolution, as the judgements from the former can be used to argue for future WTO-DSM cases. 
With respect to their direct impact on China and India, there appear to be two major areas of influence of 
the super-RTAs. The first is their potential impact on the regional production networks. RTAs such as the  
RCEP and TPP, are expected to support emerging international production networks, by reducing the  
administrative and regulatory costs of doing business in member states.  Keeping this in mind, the  
super-RTAs  might  give  more  priority  to  certain  service  sectors,  such  as  transportation, 
telecommunications, ICT, logistics and financial services, that contribute to or take advantage of the  
formation of international production and distribution networks, but some of which might be difficult to 
replicate in  emerging markets.  While  how that  dynamic  situation is  likely  to  play out is  unclear,  it  
seems likely that China’s present central role in the Asia-Pacific production networks and supply chains 
will  be adversely affected20.  This is  all  the more so given that the US-led super-RTAs put business-
friendly regulatory coherence in WTO-plus and WTO-extra issues at the heart of their key deliverables,  
and China’s domestic regulations on IP and government procurement, for example, hardly come close  
to those likely to be adopted.
However a deeper analysis of the potential impact of the super-RTAs on China (assuming a marginal  
net impact of RCEP in terms of countering the TPP effects) reveal that the net effect of a future scenario  
in which preferential market access in RTAs that do not include China pushes China out of the regional  
overlaps between the operation of any RTA-DSM and that of the WTO are far from clear (Marceau and Wyatt 2010).
19 The desire of companies to include dispute-settlement provisions that enable them to sue states directly is also causing a 
stir among some civil society representatives. It raises the issue of whether, for example, oil companies would be able to 
sue governments over a fracking moratorium. Activists fear that health and environmental concerns could suffer as a result 
of such investor-state dispute-settlement provisions (Dadush, 2013).
20 India is not very relevant for this discourse as the country is not a significant part of any major manufacturing or services 
global supply chain at the moment, largely because of its competitiveness-sapping industrial-labour policies and fractious 
domestic politics. However, assuming that the situation changes in the near term, this analysis will be equally applicable for 
India. 
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production  networks  and  supply  chains,  might  not  be  as  drastic  in  pure  economic  terms.  This  
assessment stems from: (i) Because of the already low MFN21 tariffs in most of its large trade partners, 
the trade, investment and production diversion effect of the super-RTAs in pure tariff terms is going to  
be small, and not only because the preference margins of RTA tariffs tend to be low anyway (nearly all  
available  evidence suggests  that  the trade-preference margins in  RTAs are  typically  less than  one  
percent). (ii) On the other hand, in view of its domestic labour-cost and other economic rebalancing 
compulsions in the aftermath of the 2008 financial  crisis,  China has been voluntarily moving away  
from the low-value-added-end of the export-production spectrum22 that benefits most from the tariff 
preferences, which further mutes the impact of a production network restructuring  sans China as a 
result  of the regional  super-RTA.  (iii)  Lastly,  insofar  as the potential  10-20 percent tariff-equivalent 
gains  from  harmonisation  of  administrative  rules  and  regulatory  standards  aimed  at  supply-chain 
smoothing within the super-RTA is concerned, getting the members to agree on deep integration is  
proving to be a rather difficult challenge to overcome in both the TPP and TTIP, in both the reciprocal  
tariff negotiations23 and non-tariff regulatory coherence and rule-making processes of these super-RTA 
negotiations; this then implies that the potential minimum 10 percent tariff-equivalent disadvantage  
because of non-compliant regulations or regulatory discrimination is not a critical concern for China at 
the moment. 
However,  assuming  that  the  super-RTAs  do  lead  to  a  deep  liberalisation  and  achieve  regulatory  
coherence  in  the  near  future,  a  restructuring  and/or  fragmentation  of  global  supply  chains  as  a  
consequence remains a real threat for the large Asian emerging economies, in particular China. These  
economies might then react in any of the following three ways:
(i) They adopt and upgrade to these new rules,  regulations and industrial  standards, even at some 
financial and political cost, in order to reduce the business costs of serving a world market. China took 
21 In modern international economic relations and international politics, most favoured nation or MFN is a status or level of 
treatment accorded by one state to another in international trade. The term means the country which is the recipient of this 
treatment must, nominally, receive equal trade advantages as the "most favoured nation" by the country granting such 
treatment. In effect, under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners. In 
contrast, in the early days of international trade, MFN status was usually used on a dual-party, state-to-state basis.
22 The transformation in Chinese supply chains has evolved almost unnoticed over several years. Many Chinese contract 
manufacturers are now building their own brands, investing in R&D and innovation, and tapping into China’s domestic 
markets rather than just exporting their output. This is supported by the new industrial policy thrust in the latest Five Year 
Plan of the PRC which aims for a rebalancing from resource-intensive industries to labour-, capital-, and technology-
intensive industries by focusing on strategic emerging industries, at least in the short term. Detailed plans from the State 
Council, the Development and Reform Commission, and the Ministry of Industry talk constantly of “establishing global 
supply chains that allow China to control prices”, “to make industry contribute more to the comprehensive national power”, 
and “to reduce dependence on foreign producers” (State Council,  2013). An analysis of the new service sector policies can 
be found in Karmakar, 2012.
23 Reciprocity is sign of resistance to openness, and we know that early GATT opening had been mostly unilateral, which had 
benefitted the liberalisers more than the so-called free-riders.
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this  approach  when  it  adopted  and  pre-committed  to  stricter  WTO  disciplines  during  its  accession  
process,  which helped it  to  become the world’s most  competitive economy.  Indian exporters treat  
these costs as fixed before making the decision to export  to  industrialised country markets,  often 
simultaneously  meeting both the US-  and EU-led standards (which are  almost  always higher  than 
India's  domestic  standards)  in  order  to  avoid  rejection  of  consignments24.  Chinese  and  Indian 
experience has shown that pragmatically accepting and adapting to new realities bear fruit. 
(ii)  They selectively refute the rules and production standards, based on domestic interest and the 
perceived  market  for  their  products  in  the  new  global  economic  architecture  in  which  developing  
countries and their domestic markets account for  almost  40 percent of global economic activity at  
current US$, and more than 50 percent at US$, PPP (WTO, 2013); by 2050, it is estimated that six of  
world’s seven largest economies will be outside the OECD group. The new stringent rules regarding IP,  
state-owned  enterprises,  services  sector  regulations,  government  procurement,  environmental 
regulations  and  dispute-resolution  mechanisms  in  investment  protection  agreements  are  prime 
candidates for such rebuttal. 
(iii) A third, and more likely possibility is that the emerging economies might operate on a sui generis 
dual regulatory regime in the medium term in key areas such as product standards and intellectual  
property (IP). Taking the example of the TTIP negotiations, even if the EU and US manage to create a  
“transatlantic (regulatory) fortress” or Economic NATO as a defence against export competition from the 
rising Asian emerging markets, especially China, it is uncertain that they will be able to entice these 
large  emerging  economies  into  adopting  those  rules  simply  out  of  fear  of  exclusion.  In  a  recent  
development,  both China and India  initially  ruled out  joining negotiations  on a  US-  and EU-backed  
proposal  to expand the 1996 Information Technology Agreement (ITA),  though both have benefited  
from the original ITA in multiple ways. 
The compelling reason for these economies to not unilaterally upgrade to the higher standards and  
rules, albeit harmonised, arise from the existing and expected demand structure in these economies  
(Kharas,  2010).  A  recent  World  Bank  study  shows  that  in  2011  the  per  capita  GDP  of  Brazil  was  
US$12,594,  South  Africa  was  US$8,070,  China  was  US$5,445  and  India  was  US$1,489,  while  the 
average  per  capita  GDP  in  OECD  countries  was  US$41,225,  with  the  US  per  capita  GDP  being 
US$48,11225. The demand growth is also expected to be higher in the emerging markets in the next few 
24 Based on interviews undertaken by the author of Indian SME’s in electrical and electronic manufactured products and 
exporting to both US and EU. Meeting multiple conformity assessment and differing standards add to costs, which the 
standards harmonisation will help to reduce, boosting competitiveness and even production consolidation.  
25 A recent report by PwC, average real wages in emerging markets like India could more than quadruple over by 2030, thus 
reducing the gaps with US and UK. However, India's current average monthly wage is around 25 times smaller than that of 
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decades26.  In such a situation, given that effective demand from the price-sensitive large emerging 
middle class27 is likely to remain high at home and in similar developing country markets that their  
domestic  producers/brands  can  easily  serve,  a  mass  domestic  upgrade  to  the  costlier  higher  
regulatory standards, albeit desirable, might not seem optimal to Chinese and Indian policymakers, at  
least in the near future. 
A more likely medium-term outcome is the possibility of operation of a dual regulatory regime, with the  
export-oriented  firms  in  these  economies adopting the  higher  standards,  while  a  large  part  of  the  
remaining producers servicing the domestic market continuing to use the old, less rigorous standards  
and IP regimes28.  If the latter group is significantly large (although difficult  to quantify, this share is 
likely  to  remain  about  two-thirds  of  the  total  population  in  China  and  India  for  the  next  decade  
according to various estimates), the incentive for emerging economy governments to sign up to more  
rigorous  multilateral  regulatory  standards  will  diminish,  at  least  until  the  majority  of  domestic 
consumers can afford to pay the quality premium on the higher-standard discretionary products and  
services29. Even the most optimistic TTIP and TPP analysts do not seem to expect that a truly 'deep'  
agreement outlining “gold standard regulatory cooperation” will be operational in the medium term, as 
hegemons traditionally have not shown much inclination to compromise. Much therefore will depend  
the UK; by 2030, it is likely to be only 7.5 times smaller. Over the same period, the average monthly Chinese wages could 
rise to around half of that of Spain. But the wage and purchasing power gap is expected to continue in the medium term, and 
this coupled with the forecasted exponential growth in the EM middle classes would in turn re-shape the global businesses 
product profiles (Kharas, 2010).
26 Kharas (2010) calculated that Asia’s middle class (defined as households with daily per capita incomes between US$ 10 
and 100 in PPP terms), which accounted for less than one-quarter of the global middle class in 2010 will account for over 40 
percent of global middle class consumption by 2020.
27 The rich and upper-middle class in China and India prefer to shop abroad, both for quality concerns as well as snob value, 
even for the foreign products that are available at home. The third reason for this preference, true in particular true for the 
Chinese consumer, is the high domestic taxes on foreign brands.  
28 Anecdotal evidence and market surveys in China and India do support this contention. The present day consumers in 
these market have unique characteristics. While the rich, even the upper-middle class, prefer to shop abroad given their 
snob value and quality perception, the larger mass-middle class that do aspire to buy newer products in the domestic 
markets remain price-sensitive. The small car “nano” that the Indian auto-major TATA group sells in India and in Europe are 
vastly different in their product standards, and the stripping down for the Indian market has been done with the express 
reason to keep the price down to affordable levels. A majority of Chinese and Indian consumers also seem to prefer the 
domestic produced mobile handsets even in the smartphone category to the costlier Apple iPhones, which led the company 
to develop the cheaper iPhone-5c handset for these markets. In fact, more and more Chinese suppliers and Western brands 
are now focused on China and India’s domestic market, which are becoming more attractive with rising incomes and a 
burgeoning middle class; in the 2014 Mobile World Congress in Barcelona several established companies showed off 
phones priced below US$200, in an attempt to tap into emerging markets by developing low-cost and low-tech versions of 
their smartphones. This development is very different from the deliberate creation of unique national standards, despite the 
existence of well-established global standards, which the Chinese and Indian governments are accused of for restricting 
imports. 
29 An earlier World Bank study had found that during the currency of the Doha Round, the absolute per capita income gap 
between the key emerging economies and advanced economies has widened further, affecting their net purchasing power 
and composition of products demanded. 
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on  the  credible  threat  of  economically  meaningful  discriminatory  outcomes  that  the  new  super-
regionals can actually create and its timeline. It is thus not clear if the super-RTAs under negotiation will  
have any definitive influence on expanding the multilateral trade agenda either, at least in the near  
future.
4. Conclusion 
The Doha trade talks  started  at  a  time  of  great  political  vulnerability,  launched just  after  the 9/11 
attacks  in  the US,  and had the idealistic  objective of  helping developing countries.  Many of  these  
developing economies are today performing much better than the crisis-ridden OECD countries in spite  
of the recent growth nose-dive in emerging economies. Growth in countries such as China has skewed  
the  balance  of  economic  power  and  consequent  expectations  from  the  erstwhile  poor  developing 
countries30. Fearing that negotiating in a democratic one-country-one-vote WTO system will not allow 
the richer countries as much leverage as they previously had, the focus has turned to super-RTAs that  
are expected to generate a new momentum for liberalisation and provide a boost to trade and economic 
growth in particular in the participating industrialised member countries. Super-RTAs are also intended  
to reinforce their global influence as international standard- and rule-setters. 
However, concerns have been raised that the new regionalism can succeed and provide a foundation  
on which an international trading regime can be built 'only if'  the TTIP and the TPP are balanced and  
open to the wider international community. Otherwise, there is the danger of creating expensive global  
imbalances  and  even  market  fragmentation  (Palacio,  2013).  Our  analysis  has  explored  one  such 
possibility of fragmentation, in which the stated objective of global regulatory harmonisation 31 is not 
achieved  because  the  large  emerging  economies  choose  to  not  move  up  to  the  higher  standards 
because of the lack of effective demand in their domestic markets and other high-growth emerging 
economy  markets.  The  changing  demand  patterns  may  in  fact  encourage  industrialised  economy 
multinational corporations to produce products with differing standards targeting different markets, as 
in the case of the Apple iPhone-5c. A healthy dose of realism about what can be achieved and by when 
30 Some analysts contend that the “US is also portraying as though the emerging economies are very strong and that they 
can easily undertake the commitments demanded by the US” (Narayanan, 2013) and thus pushing them to adopt a 
leadership position at the WTO negotiations, which expectation is subverted by the fact that EMs are still the home of a large 
number of poor people (living under US$ 1.25 per day) and the recent growth slowdown in these economies are further 
unlikely to aid the US cause in the near future. 
31 An interesting point to note is that the world is split between groups following US-centric and EU-centric regulations and 
standards, depending on the trading bloc individual countries belong to. When negotiating trade agreements (including 
market access treaties like the EBA or everything-but-arms and the GSP), both the US and the EU tend to impose their 
particular set of product standards and regulatory philosophies on their (usually smaller) trade partners. 
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is therefore necessary to manage expectations and retain the credibility of the new super-RTAs. These 
alternatives  also  ignore  the  considerable  amount  of  work  that  has  been  done  within  each  of  the  
negotiating areas of the Doha Round and that the 'old' trade issues including agriculture are still of great  
interest (even imperative) to many of the WTO’s members (Karmakar, 2013b). 
So what should the emerging market strategy be? Given that  the emerging countries of China, Brazil, 
India and South Africa are strongly constrained by domestic politics and economics from making an  
impasse-breaking negotiating offer, it is hard to expect definitive emerging economy leadership in the  
WTO negotiations anytime soon. However, in the interim, the large emerging economies can and should 
continue with unilateral domestic liberalisation of products and services, in self-interest and not from 
any threat-perception, and should also extend MFN treatment on these newly liberalised sectors, as 
the industrialised countries did in the early days of GATT. The same justification calls for their joining  
the government procurement agreement, and negotiating global competition policy rules to facilitate 
transparent trade and investment flows at home. The outward FDI flows from emerging economies have 
been on the rise in the last decade or so, and joining these global agreements will greatly benefit their  
domestic outward-looking firms by removing the discrimination against them in the industrial world.  
These can also pave the path for their eventual donning of the leadership cap and inducing global trade  
governance regime change. 
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